The bottom line is that (1) there is no place to hide, (2) the infection rate can be expected to be 40%, and (3) the mortality rate for those infected could be as low as 0.5% or as high as 50%, which is the current frequentist estimate.
No one seems to believe that the 50% rate will hold up as more data arrives, but it is a frightening fraction even with the current denominator of 220 or so.
Though many millions will die and no corner of the Earth be safe, mankind will muddle through. In 1918, health services completely broke down, but the rest of the social infrastructure was reasonably robust. At least this was the case in the US; Russia you might say was already ripe for change.
Still, there are many differences between 1918 and now.
As one examines the list of differences, perhaps the only change that seems to suggest that things could be better this time is that worldwide we have a more powerful and more responsible public health infrastructure. We can be confident that some of the truly stupid acts of 1918, like the Philadelphia Liberty Bond Parade, will not be repeated.
Still, there is a limit to much can good policy help, and even enlightened standards may not be sharp enough. For example, the Singapore plan closes the schools much later than I believe would be optimal. They are admitting up-front that it is very hard to close public schools until an immediate danger is clearly visible. If Singapore can't bite the bullet, what kind of mess can you expect in Philadelphia?